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Introduction 
 
The place of religion in education has long been controversial. There is no simple answer to 
the question of how religion and education are related because the complex religious history 
of each nation state gives form to those relations (see Jackson 2007). From a philosophical 
perspective, these relations have been usefully arranged into themes: religious upbringing; 
faith schools; religious education in the curriculum, religious philosophies of education, and 
issues of religious identity (see Strhan 2014). Arguably more than any other domain, the 
spaces of education (from parenting, to schooling, and beyond) are where the interactions 
between public and private are most complex and unavoidable. Therefore, I argue that 
education is a key consideration for postsecular theory, one in which neutrality is simply 
meaningless.1 In other words, to speak of neutral educational formation is oxymoronic. Some 
key questions must be addressed: What do religion, education and ‘religious education’ look 
like in a postsecular age? What philosophical and pedagogical issues are raised by the new 
context of the postsecular? The terms of this debate are by no means settled and so I explore 
the varied conceptions of secularism and the postsecular, arguing that the postsecular 
complicates rather than refutes the secularization thesis. The argument challenges the view 
of religion as basically reducible to doctrines, creeds or truth claims, showing how that 
conception of religion skews the discussion of the place of religion in education towards one 
that considers only issues of indoctrination, and the rights of parents or religious groups to 
reproduce themselves. I suggest that the post-colonial concern to reveal and challenge 
assumptions around Western liberalism provides a fresh context to articulate the postsecular 
and its influence upon education. 
 
 
The rise and fall of the secular 
 
Detecting the waning influence of secular narratives of culture around the turn of the 
millennium, Steve Bruce presented a powerful case for secularization in Western societies 
arguing that many of the strongest accounts of secularization across the social sciences (e.g. 
Marx, Weber, Durkheim and Freud), were being displaced by weaker less thoroughgoing 
counter-secularization analyses that emerged towards the close of the twentieth century. 
Bruce’s basic argument, affirming “a long-term decline in the power, popularity and prestige 
of religious beliefs and rituals” (Bruce 2002, 44), though richly descriptive of trends in 19th 
Century Britain seems inconsistent with more recent developments and events across the 
globe. One year after the publication of Bruce’s book, the anthropologist Talal Asad 
announced the end of a certain picture of secularism as a progressive, liberal project in his 
book Formations of the Secular, stating that “[i]f anything is agreed upon, it is that a 
straightforward narrative of progress from the religious to the secular is no longer acceptable” 
(Asad 2003, 1). Asad, and those have developed his lines of inquiry such as Saba Mahmood, 
José Casanova, William Connolly, Wendy Brown and many others (see Scott and Hirschkind 
2006) have enriched the terms of the debate around secularization, but the sense in which 
secularization has faltered remains an ongoing controversy (Bruce 2013, Scott and Hirschkind 
2006). What follows elaborates these insights, by arguing that the formations of 
                                                 
1 There has been some recent interest in the postsecular within educational theory: (Bowie, Peterson 
and Revell 2012), (Hotam and Wexler 2014), and (Lewin 2016). 
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postsecularism influence, and are influenced by, how education interrupts some of the more 
simplistic accounts of secularism. 
 
The turbulence across many parts of the world since the turn of the millennium (wars, 
revolutions, insurgencies, and the like), has revealed a world of dizzying complexity where 
perpetual conflict has become the norm with tensions cutting across political, cultural, 
religious and ethnic identities. Social, economic and environmental problems magnify – and 
perhaps may even constitute a decisive influence upon – these issues and differences. A 
widespread fear of secularism in parts of the Middle East and elsewhere is hard to disentangle 
from increased fundamentalism leading to the now common observation that “secularism and 
fundamentalism feed off each other” (Williams 2012, 16). A general fear of the ‘other’ is surely 
bound up with increasing religious fanaticism and fundamentalism that seems built into global 
tensions. While difficult to explain, these fears cannot be dismissed as a temporary regression 
that swims against the inevitable tide of progressive enlightenment rationalism. Rowas 
Williams sees the instrumentalization of social relations as the characteristic and problematic 
constitution a programmatic secularism, that excludes religion entirely from public life. 
Society cannot be reduced to the administration of more or less successful methods of 
maintaining public order and upholding private freedoms but inevitably relies upon moral and 
social orders grounded in ultimate principles. This is especially true in the context of 
education. The idea that these principles can be eliminated from public life does, to some 
extent, feed the fears of the secular and the reactions to the programmatic secularism that 
disavows principles and commitments in the public domain. Thus, religious revivalism and 
fundamentalism across the world cannot simply be explained away as conservative reactions 
against aspects of modernity and postmodernity but may themselves be products of certain 
formations of the secular. 
 
How can the ‘postsecular’ help us address these tensions? Does education have a particular 
role to play in forming a more inclusive society, somewhere between the secular and the 
confessional? Postsecularism offers us an opportunity to engage with the contributions of our 
religious traditions, implying neither blind obedience, nor a denial the achievements of 
modernity. Asad’s insights concerning the limitations of the secular have encouraged the 
development of the concept of the postsecular, a term which Asad himself does not use in 
Formations of the Secular (Asad 2003), but one that has come to identify, among other 
developments, the so-called ‘return of religion’, and though a complex and contested term, it 
denotes a state of affairs of particular significance for education.  
 
 
The postsecular in education 
 
These interactions between religion and culture are perhaps most keenly felt in the domain 
of education. Understanding the postsecular as a complication rather than repudiation of 
secularism (Lewin 2016, Chapter 2) encourages us to move away from the normative question 
of whether religion should (or should not) have a role in public education, to the more 
fundamental question of the ways in which religion already has (and probably inevitably will 
have) such a role. I make no claim that religion is a force for good (or bad) in education, but it 
should be recognised that religion is a fundamental force that shapes people, communities 
and education, a force that is not going away. In that sense the postsecular offers a descriptive 
term for exploring the continued significance of religion within education. Education here is 
broadly construed as any intentional formative activities. The strong claim here is that there 
is no neutral educational formation despite the fact that many so-called progressive educators 
might wish to argue for a neutral education (see Sommers 2002).   
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I would like to proceed by providing an unambiguous definition of the postsecular that goes 
beyond the notion of a return to religion, but as this volume shows, such a definition remains 
elusive. In a general sense the postsecular refers to the idea that modernity no longer entails 
an inevitable march towards secularism and the loss of faith. But already we should be alert 
to problematic conflations: of secularism, a term used to define a worldview in which religion 
is largely absent from secularization, an historical process in which social ‘progress’ and 
modernity, is associated religion losing cultural and social significance (Casanova 2009). The 
latter process is itself easily related to the growth of atheism or humanism, but ought not to 
be identified with it. This failure to distinguish between a secular worldview and secularisation 
process makes it all too easy to overlook an arguably more fundamental distinction: namely 
the secular as the public domain which is free of the private interests of particular individuals 
and groups (which does not necessarily imply a loss of faith, but rather a privatization of it) 
and the secular as a broader process in which society is generally less religious. Although 
secularism, a general loss of faith, and a rise in atheism are by no means identical, there are 
many complex intersections rendering a neat division between a secular public domain and a 
private religious sphere untenable. Public life, especially public education, requires reference 
to evaluative discourse, often informed by, or related to, religious commitments. As  Rowan 
Williams puts it, “evaluative discourse leaks out into the public sphere, sometimes in the 
moralizing rhetoric of political leaders, sometimes in the improvised rituals (of celebration or 
mourning or solidarity) that sporadically take over some part of the public territory” (Williams 
2012, 13). Once conceived as an inclusive principle of nondiscrimination, the privatization of 
religion might, in fact, stand in opposition to many central religious perspectives since “the 
very idea of deriving law from sacred texts is a repudiation of the public/private distinction” 
(Fox 2002, 22). There are good reasons why we have been so keen to embrace the idea that 
religion should be contained to the private sphere. It respects the commitments and values 
of citizens and releases shared dimensions of social life from the weight of those 
commitments. But as Asad suggests, there are equally good reasons why religion cannot be 
contained in this way, not least because religion is, by definition, a communal enterprise which 
could be seen to push against containment within the private sphere. William Connolly has 
neatly summarised Asad’s critical perspective on the secular, a perspective which presents 
the division between private and public as reflecting a partisan view of social and religious 
life: 
 
1. Secularism is not merely the division between public and private realms that allows 
religious diversity to flourish in the latter. It can itself be a carrier of harsh exclusions. 
And it secretes a new definition of "religion" that conceals some of its most 
problematic practices from itself. 
2. In creating its characteristic division between secular public space and religious 
private space, European secularism sought to shuffle ritual and discipline into the 
private realm. In doing so, however, it loses touch with the ways in which embodied 
practices of conduct help to constitute culture, including European culture. (Connolly 
2006, p. 75). 
 
Asad’s analysis is broadly consistent with Williams’s view who adds a further distinction in the 
development of a secular public space, between procedural and programmatic secularism. 
Procedural secularism takes a more pluralist attitude which disavows favour to any religious 
grouping, while trying to maintain a broad representation for all (as, for example in India), 
while programmatic secularism seeks to iron out any and every public manifestation of 
religious allegiance, with France often cited as the paradigmatic case (Williams 2012, 2).  
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If defining secularism as the neat division between private and public cannot be upheld, then 
nor can we straightforwardly define postsecularism as the reintegration of religion and public 
life because something recognisably religious has always formed part of our cultural identities. 
Thus, echoing Latour, the postsecular suggests that we have never been secular. Clearly the 
postsecular idea of a ‘return of religion’ can only take us so far, since the postsecular is 
anything but a simple return. The analogy for educational theory here might be a simple 
return to confessional religious education in schools, where a single religious perspective is 
taught as true, an approach that is out of fashion in most Western education systems (Gearon 
2013; Lewin 2017). For many, pluralism and multiculturalism signal cosmopolitanism, 
tolerance, and progress, values that underpin certain republican values which reflect a 
particular progressivist view of history. Some forms of progressive education have also been 
identified with this cosmopolitanism, looking towards an education for global citizenship 
(Bamber, Lewin, and White, 2018). This broad alignment of progressivism, education and 
secularism must be shown to be at best simplistic, it not outright wrong. 
 
 
Complicating progressivism 
 
Whether empirical or normative, our narratives of enlightened progress seem to align with, 
and reinforce, conceptions of human development that also structure ideas about education. 
In this sense education is intrinsically teleological since it is concerned with the intended 
improvement of a particular skill, knowledge, capacity, or disposition. For many progressive 
educators, the liberal project is oriented by ideals of the formation of a rational and free 
subject (Gutmann 1982). While defying the aspiration to become rational and free might not, 
in itself, seem reasonable, such teleological thinking is in danger of making us blind to the 
variety and complexity of human identity and development because we become wedded to a 
linear conception of time and progress in which modern Western culture has inaugurated the 
end of history (Fukuyama 1992). Opposition to this rather limited view of human development 
and progress may be reflected in the concomitant suspicion, even fear, of secularism as a 
project of Western progress. No doubt the strident tone within ‘aggressive secularism’ and 
the increasingly passé ‘new atheism’ reflects anxieties of resurgent religious bigotry, which 
itself seems more reactionary than substantive. If we are to escape this reactionary circle, 
then we will need a more nuanced and circumspect analysis that first of all would challenge a 
naïve, rather Eurocentric, progressivism that places a narrow form of rational subjectivity as 
the singular anthropology. So, as many postsecular theorists have argued, history has turned 
out to be more complicated than any neo-Hegelian narrative of Geistesgeschichte (roughly 
understood as cultural history in progressive development).2 This complication should expand 
the debate within educational philosophy away from rather narrow considerations of 
curriculum issues around how to reconcile competing truth claims within religious education, 
or how to express the rational civic core that all citizens must adhere to (in the UK expressed 
as the inculcation of ‘British Values’), to a broader discussion of how our fundamental 
commitments and ultimate concerns figure in education today (Lewin 2014). This raises 
questions of what religion is for people today, since the voluntaristic conception that religious 
life entails choices and decisions, to commit to a system of beliefs, truth claims or worldviews, 
is itself a very particular, and rather unhelpful, one. As Wendy Brown puts it: 
 
The conceit of religion as a matter of individual choice…is already a distinct (and 
distinctly Protestant) way of conceiving religion, one that is woefully inapt for Islam 
and, I might add, Judaism, which is why neither comports easily with the privatized 
                                                 
2 This raises the question of whether Hegel’s philosophy of history, and European Enlightenment 
philosophy more broadly, is irredeemably Eurocentric and colonialist (Tibebu 2011). 
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individual religious subject presumed by the formulations of religion freedom and 
tolerance governing Euro-Atlantic modernity (Brown 2013, 17). 
 
The conception of choice is related to a view of religion as a worldview, or set of truth claims, 
about which one makes that choice. This voluntaristic conception of religion tends to frame 
debates about the place of religion in education, contributing to a wide misunderstanding of 
the nature of (religious) commitment: as though only religious positions rely on commitments, 
while secular worldviews are based on firmer foundations of rationality alone. Secular 
perspectives embody a range of commitments which are not necessarily visible at level of 
propositions or worldviews (Lewin 2016, Chapter 3). The postsecular encourages us to 
recognise that the kinds of binaries that structure our thinking about religion – 
religious/secular, faith/reason – are deceptive, since the terms and identities are more porous 
than these accounts assume. 
 
In the field of education we must work with the conceptual fluidity of the postsecular in 
developing the different senses in which religion plays a part in the social life of public 
educational institutions. In other words, religion – in one sense or another – will inform public 
education, whether we like it or not. This does not mean that we shouldn’t consider creating 
spaces within public education that are, as far as possible, free of religious influence. Nor 
should we turn a blind eye to over-zealous religious inculcation in educational institutions 
(public or private) in the name of liberalism or tolerance. But the idea that we can leave our 
religious attitudes at the school gates presupposes a particular conception of what it means 
to be religious that, I argue, reinforces a parochialism, perhaps even imperialism, since it 
reflects what could be called a rather protestant view of what it means to be religious.3 We 
cannot deny the formative dimensions of education which means that seeing 
religious/worldview ‘neutrality’ as an educational ideal is itself by no means neutral (Cooling 
2010). It entails a narrow and inadequate understanding of religion as the cognitive assent to 
truth claims, doctrines, or worldviews. I argue against any neat separation of religion and 
education for both practical and theoretical reasons. From a practical point of view I believe 
it to be vital that children and young people become religiously literate. From a theoretical 
perspective a value-laden orientation to life is inevitable and essential whether or not we 
engage explicitly in religious or humanist formations of those values.  
 
In addition, there is an important pedagogical point here. It is not obvious that the job of 
educators is to encourage cognitive assent to truth claims, even if those claims are taken to 
be straightforwardly true. This is because learning is better served by a pedagogy of inquiry 
(or non-directive pedagogy) than a pedagogy of assent (or directive pedagogy) (see Sommers 
2002). A pedagogy of assent supposes that the substance of learning is constituted by 
relatively stable knowledge, skills and dispositions, all of which can and should be directly 
inculcated into the student. Education cannot be entirely free of the process of absorbing or 
assenting to such forms of knowledge, but the craft of teaching is better understood to entail 
indirect forms, which ultimately give the student the freedom and responsibility to take what 
they can from it. Trevor Cooling uses the example of a student asking about creationism in a 
science lesson arguing that it might not be appropriate to simply “dismiss it outright as wrong-
headed” (Cooling 2010, 11). The fact that creationism is false is not enough, since the educator 
must also employ a measure of what Van Manen calls ‘pedagogical tact’ in handling the 
situation (Van Manen 2016). Cooling’s point is that “grappling successfully with questions of 
meaning and significance contributes to developing into a healthy, balanced person and is a 
                                                 
3 The use the term Protestant here is meant to be broadly inclusive of Protestant traditions that, in 
the wake of Luther, regard sola fide, by faith alone, to be the sole ground for salvation (See Dupré 
1993). 
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fundamentally important component of education” (Cooling 2010, 14). The shift from 
directive ‘Religious Instruction’ (often referred to as catechesis within Christian communities) 
to non-directive ‘Religious Education’ in the 1988 Education Reform Act in England and Wales, 
was in part intended to address this issue: that any perception of indoctrinatory intent within 
confessional religious instruction was mitigated by an exposure to more than one religious 
tradition. The postsecular complication of linear narratives of culture continues to be felt in 
the fact that the curriculum of Religious Education is the one place in which the issues around 
taking religion seriously while simultaneously being inclusive have seemed most intractable 
(Barnes 2009; Aldridge 2015). Can there be a meaningful religious education for all? 
 
 
Education for all? 
 
Given the vast range of concepts and contexts that the postsecular evokes, is there a core 
notion that can be identified and applied to any kind of general education? The political, 
sociological, philosophical and theological registers of the term hint at a concern that might 
be understood as a post-colonial appreciation of other ways of knowing, being and educating 
which can be related to Williams’ definition of the non-secular as “a willingness to see things 
or other persons as the objects of another sensibility than my own” (Williams 2012, 13). That 
the Western liberal project, which today is manifest in a highly urbanized and consumerist 
culture, is the ‘only game in town’ scarcely needs to be stated, so self-evident has it become. 
That this Western liberalism is bound up with conceptions of universal reason and progress 
that have supplanted local indigenous communities appears equally, and problematically, 
self-evident. Mass education in 19th Century Europe seems to have gone hand in hand with a 
colonialist reach of the civilizing power of Western European education, evident for instance 
in John Gast’s painting from 1872, entitled ‘American Progress’. And ‘we’ (UNESCO, the World 
Bank, and the so-called ‘International Community’) now call for an ‘Education for All’ whose 
noble intention is to bring the benefits of an education “to every citizen in every society” 
(World Bank 2014). Have we become inured to the one-dimensional nature of the cultural and 
educational imperialism at the heart of this project? In a series of articles and a powerful film, 
Carol Black strongly argues that we have:  
 
In “developed” societies, we are so accustomed to centralized control over learning 
that it has become functionally invisible to us, and most people accept it as natural, 
inevitable, and consistent with the principles of freedom and democracy. We assume 
that this central authority, because it is associated with something that seems like an 
unequivocal good – “education” – must itself be fundamentally good, a sort of 
benevolent dictatorship of the intellect (Black 2012). 
 
Just as Jacques Rancière has pointed out the contradiction inherent to installing democracy 
(Rancière 1992), so Black argues that the installation of a particular conception of education 
for all negates the varieties of indigenous education and culture that have existed across all 
societies for hundreds of years. Black may be overstating her case, romanticizing indigenous 
cultures, or failing to recognize the complexity by placing mass education in opposition to 
indigenous education in this way. But it is hard to refute the totalizing intent of ‘Education for 
all’ and the near universal assumption that it represents an unequivocal good. For the 
purposes of my argument, the postsecular offers one way to open up a space for alternatives 
to a disenchanted, industrialised and urbanized future. It is a political, social, and spiritual 
concern that we find alternatives to the neo-liberal narratives of the future. But, to interpret 
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Heidegger’s enigmatic claim (Heidegger 1981), only a god can interrupt the totalizing power 
of that narrative.4 
 
One might object that the context and image of colonialist education cannot be identified 
with secularism. After all, colonialism was initially motivated by more than economic and 
political interests, but by an evangelizing imperative that moved in a different direction to 
secularization: seeking to bring others into the faith. This is important in view of education 
since the missionary spirit of those colonial powers took great interest in schooling: the legacy 
of British colonialism is evident in that many of the elite schools in India today, for example, 
are Christian. Surely, then, secularization should be seen in opposition to colonialism. There 
are many complex points here that can only be briefly touched upon.  
 
First, the influential theory of Carl Schmitt shows how the founding principles of secular 
society (concepts of science and progress) arise out of the theological traditions of Western 
Europe (Schmitt 2007). But this brief overview can only hope to indicate the geopolitical 
dimensions of this debate sufficiently to suggest that the missionary zeal of early colonialists 
seem largely reflected in the assumptions within liberal democratic societies: that modern 
industrialized societies are to be exported to every corner of the globe. It is the manner of 
being-in-the-world that admits of no alternatives, and that therefore fails to recognize itself 
as just one mode of being. It is, to use Heideggerian language, the oblivion of being. I am not 
for a moment suggesting that the scientific revolution, the Enlightenment, and modernity in 
general are not momentous shifts resulting in extraordinary benefits to millions, even billions 
of lives around the world. One might observe that modernity is a victim of its own success in 
the sense that it has become so all encompassing, so totalizing or enframing, again to 
reference Heidegger, that all other modes of being are all but invisible (Heidegger 1977; Lewin 
2015). Other ways of addressing global problems, environmental, social, political, and 
spiritual, are silenced. This is not, then, an attack on, or negation of, Western consumerist 
culture, technology, urbanization, or secularism more broadly, but only to acknowledge that 
this is not the only game in town. It may be that other ways of being, including religious, 
spiritual, poetic, aesthetic etc., draw more explicitly on the postsecular, inhabiting a world 
which is more than the projection of the power of subjectivity. We need to bring the 
discussion back to a more direct engagement with the question of religion, to which I return. 
 
 
The return of religion and education 
 
We have seen that the postsecular age involves acknowledging that religion has an ongoing 
influence on culture and on education particularly. Straightforward theories of secularization 
have to be reexamined in light of the ongoing influence of religion. This means disabusing 
ourselves of the assumption that “to be secular means to be modern, and therefore by 
                                                 
4 In an interview for Der Spiegel, withheld from publication until after his death, Heidegger (1991) 
enigmatically stated that “Philosophy will not be able to effect an immediate transformation of the 
present condition of the world. This is not only true of philosophy, but of all merely human thought 
and endeavor. Only a god can save us. The sole possibility that is left for us is to prepare a sort of 
readiness, through thinking and poeticizing, for the appearance of the god or for the absence of the 
god in the time of foundering [Untergang] for in the face of the god who is absent, we founder.” My 
intention with this reference is to indicate that an interruption to the prevailing liberal democratic 
order entails some radical reorientation that seems to require something ‘transcendent’. Either that, 
or we will be visited by a global environmental catastrophe which will be impossible to ignore – an 
interruption of a different kind.  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implication, to be religious means not yet fully modern” (Casanova, 2011, 59). This statement 
could be recast for educators in the following way ‘to be secular means to be critical, and 
therefore by implication, to be religious means not yet fully critical’. I would argue that the 
existence and development of critical thinking must be uncoupled from assumptions around 
secularization, and that the fear of secularization in parts of the Islamic world are associated 
with fears around certain kinds of education because of this association. Attacks on education 
in Pakistan, for example, are abhorrent. But understanding these fears as arising out of a 
misunderstanding of the relationship between criticality and credulity is an important step. In 
other words, I want to call for a softening of the polarization between criticality and credulity, 
because we all believe and affirm something before we critically engage. This is the 
hermeneutical condition, perhaps even the human condition.  
 
Softening the opposition between those who are religious and non-religious might also 
involve giving voice to those who stand betwixt and between the secular and the religious. 
The site of the postsecular gives form to the spaces or cracks that many people in the present 
age would recognize, but do not often discuss: the spaces between the secular and the 
confessional. It is in these spaces that many people find themselves: unwilling to fully negate 
religious life, nor fully able to embrace the worldviews that seem untenable. Philosophers 
might see this disposition as heralding a religion after metaphysics. Taylor calls this space a 
third way between orthodoxy and unbelief, a view that Smith, quoting Taylor, neatly captures: 
“All sorts of people feel themselves caught; ‘in the face of the opposition between orthodoxy 
and unbelief, many, and among them the best and most sensitive minds, were [and are] cross-
pressured, looking for a third way’” (Smith 2014, 64). After the putative death of God, the 
possibility of authentic religious life is an ongoing question, hence the rise in alternative forms 
of religion and interests in spirituality (King 2009). For those who consider themselves 
‘spiritual but not religious’, there may emerge an appreciation of the opportunity to explore 
the postsecular defined in terms not reducible to either pole of secular/confessional binary. 
This chapter has attempted, in different ways, to interpret the postsecular as a kind of 
complication of the secular. This complexity is essential in the domain of education where 
intentional formative activities require some reflection on the ultimate concerns of education. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
I began by asking what education might look like in a postsecular age. This entailed a 
discussion of the nature of secularism. Recently philosophers of religion have pointed out 
some of the Eurocentric biases within this notion of secularism and the propositional 
conception of religion it assumes, an analysis that I have suggested should be extended to 
education. One view of the postsecular, then, would be to develop the opportunity to ‘return 
to religion’ in ways that go beyond reductive propositional or voluntaristic views of religion – 
going beyond an understanding of religions as competing worldviews or belief-systems. 
Applied to education we might explore how different symbolic systems offer rich narratives 
to make meaning that cannot be reduced to worldviews. This would encourage a respect for 
other ways of being-in-the-world that are too often disregarded as primitive, premodern, and 
uneducated. This kind of respect amounts to a postsecular education, between the secular 
and the confessional. 
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